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SOUTH CAROLINA HONORS COLLEGE 
SENIOR THESIS 
 
VULNERABILITY AND RESISTANCE: AN EVALUATION OF HOSTILE TAKEOVER DEFENSES 
PROPOSED BY: CARISSA WILSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & BUSINESS ECONOMICS 
I.  THESIS SUMMARY 
Within the context of mergers and acquisitions (“M&A”), hostile takeovers comprise a complex 
and pivotal area of study. It is hostile takeovers, rather than friendly ones, that give rise to the need 
for most buy- and sell-side tactics related to strategic M&A. This paper focuses primarily on sell-
side tactics, or “target defenses,” used to deflect undesired takeover attempts and prevent changes 
in corporate control. It will attempt to present a high level, comprehensible, and comprehensive 
listing of defensive tactics in the target arsenal, with references to related case law.  
Target defenses developed preemptively, or before an official takeover offer has been made, are 
often called “preventive defenses,” while those created to combat a current, specified takeover 
attempt are dubbed “active defenses.” Both types of defenses have been debated as regards both 
their effectiveness and, perhaps more interestingly, their acceptability according to the various 
constructs of managerial and general business ethics.  
These constructs include, firstly, Milton Friedman’s views on the business director’s exclusive 
obligation to maximize shareholder welfare in all situations; it can be argued that directors who 
choose to fight a lucrative buyout offer using target defenses may be unethically depriving 
shareholders of possible gains to which they are unexceptionally entitled. Next, the business 
judgment rule describes circumstances in which directors are due certain decision-making license; 
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in those cases where directors do not qualify for protection under the business judgment rule, they 
may be held liable in court for injury or perceived injury to the business and its shareholders. 
This debate over the acceptability of target defenses has been voiced primarily through courtroom 
testimony and resulting judicial decisions. Through these decisions, a three-tiered framework has 
been built to assess the appropriateness of target defenses. Using this framework, the relevant court 
officials will evaluate (Wong 173): 
1. Whether the target board acted in good faith when adopting the defense. 
2. Whether the defense is preclusive or subject to heightened levels of judicial scrutiny.  
3. Whether the target defense is proportional to the threat posed.  
This paper will evaluate the context in which this framework was created. It will provide a timeline 
of landmark and similarly notable cases through which the framework was developed over time. 
Finally, it will comment on the development of the concept of judicial review in the field of target 
defenses in M&A.  
II. INTRODUCTION 
Mergers and acquisitions are elements of corporate financial and strategic management which 
involve organizational restructuring through the purchase, sale, combination, or division of 
companies or institutions. This is done, most typically, to increase market share and 
competitiveness, to unlock synergies through economies of scale, and to create value for 
shareholders. 
These takeovers come in many forms – public and private, horizontal and vertical, conglomerate 
and otherwise. From a strategic perspective, the most interesting merger dichotomy is “friendly” 
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versus “hostile.” Friendly takeovers occur when an acquisition is approved by the management of 
the company being acquired, i.e. the “target” company. Hostile takeovers, in contrast, occur when 
an acquirer or “bidder” utilizes strong-arm tactics to overrule opposition from target management. 
The proposed thesis will evaluate forms of target opposition, known as takeover defenses, from a 
legal and business perspective. It will do so, most principally, to address the following questions:  
1. What factors or qualities of a company, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, contribute to its 
vulnerability to hostile takeover?  
2. What are the takeover defenses that make up the arsenal available to target management 
and how effective are these defenses at warding off unwanted takeover attempts?  
3. How ethically permissible are various target defenses as means to maintain or enhance 
shareholder value and managerial control? 
These questions will be assessed through a survey of the relevant scholarly literature, including an 
examination of important case law.  
III. BRIEF HISTORY OF MERGER ACTIVITY 
Since the popularization of M&A in the late 19th century, both the quantity and quality of takeover 
activity has risen and fallen along peaks and troughs (Lipton 4). Substantial rises in takeover 
activity are regularly referred to as “merger waves” (Lipton 4) 
According to The Oxford Handbook of Mergers and Acquisitions, each major wave is 
“characterized by a predominance of one type of takeover strategy” or acquisition motive 
(Faulkner 13). The six generally accepted waves and their predominant strategies are as follows: 
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First Wave (1893-1904): 
The first merger wave was motivated by westward-expanding business and the industrial 
revolution (Lipton 4). This wave saw the rise of horizontal mergers, those which occur between 
firms in the same general line of business. Through horizontal mergers, business owners of steel, 
telephone, oil, mining, and railroad assets began to form highly profitable and expansive empires 
(Lipton 4). Horizontal mergers were checked to some degree with the enactment of various early 
antitrust laws in 1904 (Lipton 4).  
Second Wave (1919-1929): 
The second merger wave was motivated by the emergence of major automobile manufacturers and 
marked by industry consolidation (Lipton 4). This wave saw the rise of vertical mergers, mergers 
between firms at different levels of the supply chain in which the buyer extends back toward the 
source of raw material or forward toward the end consumer (Lipton 4). “For example,” says Lipton, 
Ford “was integrated from the finished car back through steel mills, railroads and ore boats to the 
iron and coal mines” (Lipton 4). This wave concluded with the 1929 Crash and the Great 
Depression (Lipton 4).  
Third Wave (1955 to 1969-1973): 
With the third merger wave, hostile takeovers and conglomerate mergers, mergers between firms 
in unrelated lines of business for the purpose of diversification, gained popularity (Lipton 5). 
Conglomerate stocks later crashed, putting an end to the wave and eliminating most of the 
anticipated benefits of the diversification sought by companies throughout the era (Lipton 5). 
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Fourth Wave (1974-1980 to 1989): 
This period of M&A, though sometimes thought to have begun in 1980, has its roots as far back 
as the first major hostile bid (Lipton 5). This bid was made by Morgan Stanley and Inco for ESB 
in 1974 (Lipton 5). The majority of this period is littered with appearances by rising corporate 
raiders and coercive buy-side tactics, not checked until the creation of the poison pill in the mid-
1980s (Lipton 5). Overall, the fourth wave of M&A activity is noted for the rise of leveraged 
buyouts, along with numerous insider trading scandals, and ended with the collapse of the junk 
market (Lipton 5).  
Fifth Wave (1993-2000): 
The fifth merger wave has been characterized as the era of the mega-deal (Lipton 6). High 
valuation global strategic mergers substantially increased in prominence due to a new “global view 
of competition” (Lipton 6). Antitrust restrictions were relatively lax in this period, allowing for 
major combinations of companies such as Exxon and Mobil, the record-setting $165 billion deal 
between AOL and Time Warner, and others (Lipton 6). According to Lipton, this wave ended in 
2000 with the millennium bubble burst and Enron scandal which “gave rise to the revolution in 
corporate governance” (Lipton 6).  
Sixth Wave (2003-present): 
The existence of a sixth wave of merger activity is somewhat debated by M&A practitioners and 
scholars, many of whom believe the wave of 1993 is still ongoing. Regardless, the last decade of 
merger activity has been significantly affected by globalization and government influence (Lipton 
7).   
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Today, the “M” in M&A has lost much of its relevance to the term. According to the authors of 
the Oxford Handbook, “very few of the new relationships are mergers in the sense of a future of 
equals” (Faulkner 12). Cooperation between corporate leaders to maximize shared resources is 
rare. Rather, as argued by Michael Jensen, takeovers are “the arena in which alternative 
management teams compete for the right to manage corporate resources” (Jensen 23).  
These so-called management teams represent both acquirers seeking to purchase other companies 
as well as purchase targets seeking to resist purchase attempts and retain company ownership. This 
resistance is manifested through strategic target defenses, the primary focus of this paper.  
IV. BUY-SIDE STRATEGY AND IMPLICATIONS 
i. Takeover Motives and Tactic Selection 
Takeover activity is motivated by a wide variety of financial, economic, reputational, and other 
concerns. To some extent, knowledge of the motives and strategy underlying a takeover launch 
may be helpful to targets in the selection of effective defenses against the takeover.  
In general, acquiring companies are motivated to undergo M&A in pursuit of economies of scale, 
complementary resources, consolidation and reduction of industry overcapacity, expansion into 
new or foreign markets, R&D acquisitions, or empire building (Faulkner 2). Economies of scale, 
the natural goal of frequent horizontal mergers, represent cost savings and efficiency 
improvements resultant from the sharing of central services and elimination of redundancies.  
In the case of specific tactic selection by acquirers and their rationale for choosing to launch a 
certain kind of bid (hostile or friendly, horizontal or vertical, and so on), two main contexts are 
influential: strategy and corporate governance (Faulkner 1). As will be discussed in a later section, 
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the legal jurisdiction in which the intended target company operates also influences what tactics 
are available to the acquirer to ensure acceptance of a bid in the face of both national and state 
regulations. 
The ultimate goal of M&A, regardless of the various strategic forces at play, is to create value for 
shareholders. This point is particularly relevant to the debate on the acceptability of takeover 
defenses. As will also be discussed in a later section, many professionals argue the use of takeover 
defenses by an acquisition target seeking to prevent a change of power may reduce or even 
eliminate shareholder value. When officers of a company act in ways which reduce shareholder 
value, they are typically deemed to be in breach of their fiduciary and other ethical duties.   
ii. Aggressive Acquirer Tactics 
As previously stated, the main contexts which shape takeover tactic selection by acquirers include 
underlying strategy, corporate governance, and the legal and practical availability of various 
tactics. Some acquirer tactics are regarded as coercive in certain states or countries and are 
therefore illegal. These restrictions serve as the most basic form of defense against unwanted 
advances by acquirers.  
Prominent forms of coercive buy-side tactics include Saturday night specials and two-tier tender 
offers. Saturday night specials are considered coercive due to the excessive time pressure placed 
on shareholders to tender during a highly restricted offer period (Faulkner 19). Saturday night 
specials are prohibited in most jurisdictions (Faulkner 19). In contrast, two-tier tender offers, 
which pose similar time pressure, are permitted throughout most of the US (Faulkner 20). When a 
bidder launches a two-tier tender offer, he first offers to purchase a limited number of shares at a 
certain price during a set period of time (Faulkner 20). He then poses a secondary offer with a 
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lower price per share and a later expiration date (Faulkner 20). Shareholders are more likely to 
tender and to tender early due to the fear of missing out on the higher first-tier price (Faulkner 20).  
Other semi-controversial buy-side tactics include bear hugs, toeholds, dawn raids, and a variety of 
other diverse and intricate techniques. In the case of the bear hug tactic, an eager bidder will make 
a high priced bid, essentially obligating target management to accept based on the magnitude of 
their “fiduciary responsibility” to shareholders (Gupta 136).  
Toeholds represent the bidder’s initial ownership share in the target before a bid is ever officially 
initiated (Faulkner 16). Despite the many benefits of toeholds, namely the diminished need for 
acquisition of new shares in order to establish control, only 13% of bidders in the US in the period 
from 1973-2002 possessed toeholds (Faulkner 16). Toeholds, and the gradual stake building which 
often accompanies them, are more often seen in strictly hostile takeovers (Faulkner 16).  
Though toeholds are ultimately subject to few restrictions, dawn raids, a related tactic, are 
somewhat more controversial. Dawn raids allow would-be acquirers to create substantial toeholds 
over a short period of early morning time, as soon as the market opens (Faulkner 17). The primary 
benefit for acquirers of the dawn raid tactic is that stock is acquired at market price, a price “which 
does not incorporate the anticipation of a takeover bid” (Faulkner 17).  
The most common and straight-forward acquirer tactics include proxy fights and tender offers. 
These tactics are particularly relevant to our discussion of target defenses since they are most often 
used in hostile takeovers to circumvent acquisition-averse target management. Proxy fights, or 
proxy contests, are waged by a “dissenting group” of shareholders who seeks to enhance their own 
representation on the board through the replacement of non-compliant members (Gupta 136). This 
tactic is often utilized when target management has opposed a merger despite shareholders’ 
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disapproval (Gupta 136). If would-be acquirers possess a toehold or can otherwise influence 
shareholder opinion, this tactic can be used to move targets toward a deal.  
Tender offers, a simpler form of the more coercive two-tier offer, take place when the acquirer 
goes over the heads of target management to negotiate directly with shareholders of the target for 
the tender of their shares (Gupta 136). This is often an acquirer’s first step toward hostile dealings 
after a friendly transaction attempt has failed (Gupta 137).  
Regardless of which tactic is selected by the acquirer, its effects will be subject to influence by 
larger dynamics. Takeover tactics have circumstantial, rather than inherent power and thus, in 
theory, may be thwarted through manipulation of their broader influencers.  
V. TARGET DEFENSES 
In many cases, target management is resistant to the prospect of acquisition. This resistance is 
usually attributed to the historical trend of post-acquisition capacity reduction and the dismissal of 
target employees to make way for the acquirer’s management, operations, and procedures 
(Faulkner 3). Thus, after an acquisition, especially one of non-equals, target management will 
likely be out of a job as managers of the acquiring company dismember the target’s old business 
structure to complement their own.  
i. Sources of Target Vulnerability 
Despite detailed looks at the M&A paper trail of the last several decades, researchers have detected 
few true patterns to explain why one company is targeted by unsolicited bidders and another is 
not. Some firms target small businesses for takeover while others target large competitors. Some 
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firms specialize in acquiring and revamping struggling businesses while others select only thriving 
enterprises to help bolster their own performance.  
That being said, there are a number of factors which are deemed to make a target more attractive 
to potential acquirers. These include a low q-ratio, a liquid balance sheet, good cash-flow, low 
profit and EPS ratios, detachable subsidiaries or properties, and small stock holdings under 
incumbent management (Gupta 135).  
For the most part, these qualities are signs of a healthy business. They contribute to target 
vulnerability because they provide for ease of financing for the acquirer and suggest high value-
creating potential of the acquisition (Gupta 135). It is then a paradox of the acquisitions game that 
healthy business is both a source of vulnerability and the greatest defense against takeover. 
According to Manju Gupta in his book, Contemporary Issues in Mergers and Acquisitions: 
“It is often proposed that the best defense against a takeover is for the firm to be highly 
efficient, its sales growth favorable, and its profitability margins high. However, the firm 
could become a takeover target of another firm seeking to benefit from an association with 
such an efficient firm. In addition, if it has long-range investment plans with pay-offs that 
are not reflected in its current stock price, the firm might be viewed as undervalued” (Gupta 
135). 
Because of this paradox, reducing vulnerability is difficult and often profit-reducing. For 
companies seeking to avoid acquisition, there is often nowhere to hide. Many managers thus feel 
that takeover potential must be addressed head-on, resulting in the popularization of strategic target 
defense tactics.   
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ii. Preventive Target Defenses 
Preventive defense tactics are those used to reduce the threat or likelihood of a takeover before 
one has been launched by either decreasing the attractiveness of acquisition or increasing its 
difficulty.  
As previously discussed, many qualities such as a low q-ratio, a liquid balance sheet, low profit 
and EPS ratios, and small stock holdings under incumbent management all increase attractiveness 
to acquirers leading to heightened vulnerability (Gupta 135). However, reversal of these qualities 
can lead to declines in profit and the overall health of the target business.  
More positive preventive defenses include enhancing share prices and safeguarding positive 
investor relations (Faulkner 22). High share prices ensure high valuations of the target company, 
often substantially increasing the purchase price and reducing affordability for potential bidders.  
Share prices also affect shareholder satisfaction. As will be discussed in a later section, 
shareholders hold the key to most hostile takeover success stories. Happy and well-compensated 
shareholder are less likely to be receptive to tender offers and similar hostile buy-side tactics.  
Procedural restrictions mark a yet more substantive approach to preempting an acquisitions 
campaign before it is launched. Since the 1960s, some companies have introduced various clauses 
to their formative documents to complicate the acquisitions process with red tape, hidden costs, 
and other deterrents for participants on either side of the feared deal. The most common anti-
takeover amendments include: classified boards, super majority, fair price, dual class 
recapitalization and leveraged recapitalization. 
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a. Classified Boards 
One common approach by would-be acquirers to assure the success of a bid is to acquire 
representation and thus voting power on the target company’s board. Such representation gives a 
bidder enhanced bargaining power and influence over the target’s board and shareholders. To 
preempt such action on the part of future potential bidders, around 60% of US corporations have 
implemented a defense tactic called the “classified” or “staggered” board (Zarin 15).  
The creation of a classified board requires shareholder approval and is valued for its addition of 
significant time and financial costs to gaining board membership (Gordon 4). Rather than 
reelecting all board members annually, companies with classified boards submit a small grouping 
of board members for reelection each year. “For example,” Gupta says, “a nine-member board 
might divide into three classes, with only three members standing for election to a three-year term 
each year” (Gupta 138). 
Board seats are generally acquired through the purchase of shares; however, in the face of a 
staggered board structure, even with sufficient funds, a targeting company may only purchase a 
limited number of seats in a given year. It cannot possibly buy out the entire board at one time. 
This time delay often results in added expenditures and financing difficulties for the acquiring 
company, further deterring bidding attempts (Gupta 138).  
The classified board defense has been deemed “moderate” in effectiveness by various studies 
including those performed by Bebchuk, Coates & Subramanian (Zarin 15). In addition to its 
preemptive merits, the defense is further said to substantially increase a company’s likelihood of 
“remaining independent” in the case that a hostile bid is launched (Gordon 822-823).  
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However, despite its popularity, this strategy is sometimes questioned due to the negative effect 
on shareholder profits (usually an 8%-10% reduction in acquisition premium) in the case the 
defense fails and a sale is achieved (Zarin 15). Overall, no significant decline in stock prices has 
been seen with the passage of such amendments. 
b. Super Majority 
Super majority provisions are considered a “mild” takeover defense and require a heightened level 
of internal approval, usually 80%, for a merger to take place (Ruback 57). According to Richard 
S. Ruback of the Harvard Business School, “some super majority provisions apply to all mergers” 
while others “are only applied at the board’s discretion to takeovers that they oppose or that involve 
a large stockholder” (Ruback 57).  
In most cases, super majority provisions are seen to have little negative impact on stock price. 
However, in cases where an escape clause has been adopted to allow for special exceptions to the 
super majority rule, a “statistically significant” return of 5% is often seen with the passage of the 
amendment (Ruback 57). Escape clauses, also called “board-outs,” usually hold that the super 
majority provision will not apply if the merger is approved by the board of directors (Gupta 137).  
c. Fair Price 
According to Ruback, fair price amendments are, themselves, a type of escape clause which allow 
for the waving of a super majority provision if the bidder proposes to pay all stockholders the same 
price in the acquisition (Ruback 58). The price may be given in terms of a price minimum or 
earnings multiple (Gupta 138).  
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As a defense mechanism, fair price amendments are enacted to discourage two-tier tender offers 
(Ruback 58). Two-tier tender offers are those in which a bidder offers to purchase a fraction of the 
target’s common stock at a high price followed by a secondary offer for additional shares at a 
reduced price and later expiration date (Ruback 58). This acquirer tactic creates an early bird 
advantage, motivating shareholders to tender early. 
In the case of fair price amendments, the bidder must offer the same price to all shareholders, 
usually the “blended price” – essentially the average of the first and second tier offers (Ruback 
58). According to Ruback, “this restructures the offer, but does not raise the cost of acquiring the 
target” (Ruback 58). That being said, fair price amendments reduce the time pressure on 
shareholders to accept the offer and may result in lower acceptance overall.  
d. Dual Class Recapitalization 
Dual class equity structures are a relatively rare pre-bid defense, in part due to the one share, one 
vote rule put in place by the SEC, applicable, in particular, to the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) (Ruback 60). However, this defense may increase in relevance if the NYSE is successful 
in lobbying for a removal of the dual class restriction (Ruback 60).  
A dual class plan structures the equity of the firm into two different classes, one with inferior and 
one with superior voting rights (Ruback 60). According to Ruback, the inferior class voting rights 
usually constitute one vote per share while superior rights usually constitute ten votes per share 
(Ruback 60).  
Though, in many cases, these plans “may not have substantially changed the probability of being 
taken over” for target firms, dual class recapitalizations can sometimes be highly impactful 
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takeover defenses (Ruback 61). Because the superior voting stock of the two-tier structure usually 
has lower dividends and marketability, holders of this so-called superior stock are motivated to 
exchange for ordinary common stock (Ruback 60). This occurrence leads to the concentration of 
voting power “in the hands of incumbent managers,” making it more difficult for potential bidders 
to gain control or to replace managers (Ruback 61).  
e. Leveraged Recapitalization 
A considerably newer tactic, leveraged recapitalization was popularized in 1985 by Multimedia 
and Goldman Sachs (Gupta 147). Leveraged recapitalization plans involve the issuance of a “super 
dividend,” funded through debt assumption (Gupta 146). The conversion of equity to debt 
increases the firm’s leverage, making takeover less appealing to potential acquirers (Gupta 146-
147).  
Leveraged recapitalization is considered a promising substitute to both white knights and 
leveraged buy-outs (Gupta 147). The plan is thought to increase the controlling power of target 
management and to raise the share price received by shareholders (Gupta 147).  
Though recapitalization plans do not always require charter amendments, they usually require 
stockholder approval and may be prohibited based on legislative restrictions or previous debt 
agreements in the company’s own documents (Gupta 147). Furthermore, according to Gupta, “all 
companies that used an LCO have also made charter amendments such as super majority voting 
or adopting poison pill voting plans” (Gupta 147). 
In addition to anti-takeover amendments, companies may choose to implement repellant measures. 
Repellent tactics usually do not require changes to the company’s formative documents but are 
Wilson 18 
 
adopted for the same purpose, in attempt to prevent takeovers which have not yet been formally 
identified or officially launched.  
f. Poison Pills 
According to Guhan Subramanian of the Yale Law Journal, the poison pill is “by far the most 
important defense today” (Subramanian 625), despite its fairly recent introduction in the 1980s by 
New York attorney, Martin Lipton (Zarin 16). Poison pills are special offers of particular rights or 
share purchasing options tentatively granted to shareholders, which can be later “redeemed,” or in 
other words eliminated, by the board of directors (Zarin 16). The offers are “inactive” until 
“triggered” by board action in order to discourage a likely hostile bid launch (Zarin 16).  
These outstanding options make the company less appealing and more expensive to potential 
purchasers because of the necessity to “swallow” the pill and all resultant costs when acquiring 
the business. However, in many cases, if the bidder can manage to acquire control of the target’s 
board, it can usually eliminate the pill itself and proceed with the tender offer as usual 
(Subramanian 627). Targets can safeguard against this threat by supplementing a pill with a 
measure such as a staggered board, making it more difficult for bidders to gain board control (Zarin 
18). 
The two primary variations on poison pills include the “flip-in” and the “flip-over” provision 
(Subramanian 625). These pills are activated in the event that a shareholder or group of 
shareholders surpasses a certain specified level of share ownership, usually between ten and twenty 
percent (Subramanian 625). In such cases, the flip-in provision gives target shareholders the rights 
to buy shares of the target while the flip-over provision gives shareholders the right to buy shares 
of the acquirer (Subramanian 625). 
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Additional pills of varying potency exist, such as the dead hand and slow hand pill, as well as the 
“just say no” defense. The dead hand pill specifies that the pill can only be redeemed by those 
directors who were in office at the time the pill was first developed, or their “approved successors” 
(Subramanian 628). The slow hand pill dictates that no pill may be redeemed for a given period of 
time after a change in composition of the target’s board, making acquisition additionally time-
consuming (Subramanian 628). 
As will be discussed in detail in a later section, the “just say no” defense was first endorsed by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in the 1990s and has been used controversially in the years since 
(Subramanian 626). The tactic has since allowed target companies to preserve friendly mergers in 
the face of superior hostile offers by simply refusing to redeem their poison pills (Subramanian 
626).  
As a highly debated defense, the legality of each variation of the poison pill varies greatly by state. 
The relative potency of pill variations can be seen in the diagram referenced below along with the 
states that endorse them. It is also important to note that, for the most part, companies which do 
not have a poison pill in place have the opportunity to create one very rapidly, meaning that most 
negotiation is done, at minimum, in the “shadow” of a poison pill (Subramanian 625). 
(See Poison Pill Diagram in Appendix) 
In the US, the board of directors of a company can develop a poison pill without seeking 
shareholder approval (Zarin 16). Additionally, because a pill is essentially “a dividend of rights to 
purchase stock, and the board has the exclusive authority to issue dividends,” a pill can be adopted 
in as little time as a “matter of hours” (Subramanian 625). For these reasons, poison pills are 
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considered highly effective both as preventive measures and active defenses after a hostile bid is 
launched.  
g. Poison Puts 
A variation on the poison pill, poison puts are part of a defensive strategy which seeks to impose 
substantial repayment obligations on acquirers as well as to protect bondholders from value 
deterioration risks which accompany a change in control (Gupta 141).  
The poison put gives bondholders the right to demand redemption before maturity in the case of 
events such as a restructuring of company ownership, or, more pointedly, an acquisition. Like with 
most other repellants, the stated rights and attached acquirer expenses are “triggered” typically by 
a hostile change in control (Gupta 141). Overall, this tactic has been viewed as a more effective 
protection device than a genuine defense (Gupta 141).  
h. Parachutes 
Parachutes are another protective measure, somewhat similar in nature to poison pills and puts, 
implemented to reduce the attractiveness of a target to potential bidders and triggered by the 
change in control.  In general, parachutes are severance agreements which provide employees 
with large compensation packages, often two to three times annual salary if the employee is 
terminated as the result of an unwelcomed change in control of the company (Reed 495).  
Though golden parachutes are the most popular and noted form of the tactic, silver and tin 
parachutes are also employed. Golden parachutes shield top executives from the negative effects 
of a hostile takeover; they require the payment of large lump sums, often multiples of the 
manager’s salary and bonus, in the case the manager is terminated as the result of an acquisition 
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(Gupta 141). Given the preference toward post-acquisition capacity reduction and the retention 
of the acquirer’s management over residual target employees (Faulkner 3), these expenses must 
be considered likely to be incurred by the acquirer.  
Silver parachutes are used to protect a more extensive employee group, usually composed of 
middle managers, and often involve severance packages equaling six to twelve months’ salary 
(Gupta 142). Lastly, tin parachutes are severance payments for the lowest level employees 
usually constituting one to two weeks’ pay for every prior year of employment (Gupta 142). 
Whereas golden parachutes may have some effect in dissuading takeover attempts, less costly 
silver and tin parachutes must be considered primarily protective measures.  
Parachutes are frequently used in combination with other more potent defense measures, but are 
often still unsuccessful in diverting impending bids. However, a survey by Lambert and Larcker 
indicates the implementation of parachutes – specifically golden parachutes – increases the 
wealth of shareholders by an average of three percent (Zarin 19). All this being said, golden 
parachutes often have the undesired effect of incentivizing executives and “potential 
beneficiaries” to support a takeover that might otherwise have been rejected (Faulkner 24).  
i. Employee Stock Option Plans 
Employee stock option plans are sometimes used to improve performance and to align employee 
interests with those of the company (Gupta 148). The plans involve the offering of stock options 
or equity to a wide base of employees. These plans are thought to make hostile takeovers more 
difficult for potential acquirers through the distribution of ownership rights over a group of highly 
contented employees who are “likely to be sympathetic to management” (Gupta 148).  
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iii. Active Target Defenses 
As has been discussed, a variety of pre-bid acquisition defenses exist which serve a repellant 
function, making the target less attractive to potential bidders (Faulkner 20-21). Once a hostile bid 
is actually made or “is imminent,” a variety of other defenses become available and relevant to the 
dissuasion of an unwelcome offer (Faulkner 26).  
These additional defenses are sometimes called “counter-bids” and represent more active and 
focused tactics (Faulkner 3). Post-bid defenses have significant intrinsic value and possible 
advantage over preventive defenses in that targets possess greater knowledge of the nature and 
motivations of the bid they are trying to thwart. Unfortunately, it is also possible that defenses 
erected after a bid has been launched may be too late to be effective.  
a. Divestments 
Divestments are yet another mechanism through which companies under high threat of takeover 
seek to reduce attractiveness. Divestments are of two primary forms: crown jewel sales and pre-
emptive sales (Faulkner 24). In the first scenario, targets sell off parts of the business which are 
particularly sought-after by the acquirer (Faulkner 24). This defense can be highly effective, 
particularly in the case of targeted acquisitions; however, it may also reduce the value of the 
company in such a way as to produce negative effects for the existing company. 
Alternatively, targets may sell off parts of the business which are deemed to be “under-
performing” in order to boost performance and reduce shareholders’ incentives to sell (Faulkner 
24). This strategy can be particularly dangerous as it may actually increase the attractiveness of 
the target to potential bidders.  
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b. Share Repurchases 
Share repurchases are a straightforward defense with “two-fold” impact (Gupta 142). In 
implementing this strategy, the target firm under attack repurchases its own floating shares from 
the public (Gupta 142). By doing this, targets (Gupta 142):  
1. Reduce the number of shares which can be easily purchased by hostile acquirers. 
2. Increase the stake held by target management without the necessity of new investment.  
The four major types of share repurchases are fixed price tender offers, Dutch auctions, 
transferable put rights, and open market repurchases (Gupta 142-143). Each of these mechanisms 
will be defined and discussed below. 
In a fixed price tender offer, either a set percentage or alternatively the entire body of shares is 
sought at a set price over a limited time (Gupta 143). The offer price is usually above going market 
value, resulting in most fixed price offers being at least fully subscribed (Gupta 143).  
In the case of Dutch auctions, targets determine the number of shares they wish to repurchase as 
well as the acceptable price range in which shareholders may offer to tender shares (Gupta 143). 
The number of shares desired by the firm is used to determine the price at which the shares will be 
repurchased (Gupta 143). If the minimum price which will result in the desired number of shares 
being offered is $17, all shareholders will receive that price, even if they might have been willing 
to tender for less (Gupta 143).  
Next, in the case of transferable put rights, a set number of shares is sought for repurchase by the 
target (Gupta 143). Transferable put rights (TPR) are then issued at a given rate, such as one TPR 
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for every 20 shares (Gupta 143). Afterwards, “a secondary market” develops for the sale and 
purchase of TPRs (Gupta 143).  
Lastly, in open market repurchases, firms agree to buy back a set dollar amount of shares (Gupta 
144). This method represents the most common form of share repurchase but is generally only 
effective for the repurchase of small percentages of total shares (Gupta 144).  
c. Greenmail Payments 
The term “greenmail” combines the ideas of blackmail and greenbacks or dollar bills (Faulkner 
25). Greenmail payments represent a defense in which target management seeks to preserve 
control by buying out a potential acquirer at a high premium (Faulkner 25).  
This defense is used in cases where a tender offer by an identified acquirer is feared and in which 
said potential acquirer has formed a substantial stake in the target company through the purchase 
of shares (Faulkner 25). The premium paid is sometimes called a “goodbye kiss” or “bon voyage 
bonus” (Faulkner 25).  
Though this tactic is often effective in the short-run, long-run consequences can be substantial. 
Firstly, the so-called defense may signal the target’s vulnerability to other potential acquirers or 
even merely those seeking to benefit from the same cash payout (Faulkner 25). Additionally, share 
prices of the target firm often drop after a greenmail payment which can contribute yet further to 
future vulnerability (Faulkner 25). Due to these risks, greenmail is viewed as a highly controversial 
defense and has been prohibited in several jurisdictions (Faulkner 25). 
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d. Standstill Agreements 
Standstill agreements are contractual arrangements purposed to prevent continuous stake building 
by an intended acquirer (Gupta 144). The standstill specifies that the would-be acquirer must not 
increase its holdings in the target while the agreement is active (Gupta 144). Alternatively, the 
agreement may specify that the acquirer will not increase its holdings beyond a certain percentage 
(Gupta 144). In many cases, this is done while escapes from the hostile bid are sought or while the 
possibility of a greenmail payment is being discussed (Gupta 144).  
The potential acquirer is motivated to participate in the agreement by the payment of a substantial 
fee by the target. Though standstill agreements are put into place before a bid has been officially 
launched, they are considered active defenses in that they are 1. Unrelated to the target’s formative 
documents and 2. Used only when a bid is deemed imminent based on substantial stake building 
on the part of the potential acquirer.  
e. Litigation 
After the launch of an official hostile bid, targets can seek to eliminate the bid through litigation. 
Most commonly, targets sue for temporary injunctions to serve the same function as a standstill 
agreement: to temporarily prevent the undesired bidder from increasing its current stake (Gupta 
148). In such cases, targets will typically also bring into question the antitrust effects of the 
acquisition, inadequate disclosure, and other legal violations on the part of the bidder (Gupta 148).  
f. Pac-Man Defense 
Pac-Man is one of the most aggressive and risky tactics in the target’s arsenal; employment of this 
measure is likely to mitigate the effects of many other defenses, especially those related to antitrust 
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arguments (Gupta 148-149). In the Pac-Man defense, the original target initiates a bid to purchase 
the initial would-be acquirer (Gupta 148-149). According to Gupta, this defense suggests, 
essentially, that “the target company’s board and management are in favor of the acquisition,” but, 
“they disagree about which company should be in control” (Gupta 148-149).  
Additional risks of the Pac-Man defense include the possibility that both firms could be ruled to 
be subsidiaries of each other under state law, complicating the M&A process for all participants 
and likely resulting in substantial cost implications (Gupta 148-149). 
g. White Knights 
The white knight is a highly involved defense in that it requires the active, long-term participation 
of a third party (Zarin 20). Faced with a hostile bid, targets often seek “white knights,” a pseudo 
savior company who will take the target over under more favorable conditions (Zarin 20). White 
knights may be deemed preferable to existing acquirers for numerous reasons, including beliefs of 
better fit, better synergies, and better post-acquisition retention outlooks for employees (Zarin 20). 
Though this tactic may be effective in thwarting a specific hostile bid, its ultimate outcome is likely 
takeover (Zarin 20). 
h. White Squires 
In many cases, the white squire defense may be much more favorable that the white knight 
approach. In application of the white squire defense, a third party (usually a portfolio investor) is 
sought out to whom a large block of shares is issued, rather than a controlling percentage as in the 
white knight defense (Gupta 146). This method dilutes the current stake of the would-be hostile 
acquirer by raising the total number of shares (Gupta 146). Additionally, the agreement between 
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target and squire can be drafted so as to prevent the squire from transferring shares to another 
hostile acquirer in the future (Gupta 146).  
VI. NECESSITY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
i. Theories of Business Obligation 
The debate on the necessity and effectiveness of target defenses is a complex and extensive one, 
based on various perspectives on the nature and purpose of business. The debate itself seems to 
stem from two sometimes contrasting ideologies: 1. Milton Friedman’s position on the purely 
financial obligations of business managers and 2. The business judgment rule which is most 
commonly used to assess managerial conduct in a legal context.  
Friedman insists that the supreme obligation of business managers is to optimize shareholder 
returns; furthermore, essentially any conduct which reduces shareholder returns can be ultimately 
viewed as the levying of a tax on shareholders and a misappropriation of authority. According to 
Friedman, managers serve as agents of the business and thus have limited discretion in matters 
likely to have a negative impact on financial returns of the firm.  
In many instances, M&A is much like a game of monkey in the middle; hostile buyers go over the 
heads of managers to shareholders; managers go over the heads of shareholders to white knights 
or other sources of salvation from takeover. Many target defenses are mechanisms employed by 
managers to thwart, manipulate, or at least change the minds of shareholders who are open to 
takeover.  
Furthermore, the motives which underlie target defenses often have more to do with fear of 
administrative and staffing repercussions resulting from a change in control than actual issues of 
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shareholder finances. Thus, critics may question whether managers who choose to fight lucrative 
acquisition offers act in the best financial interests of their shareholders.  
Alternatively, the business judgment rule offers a greater level of discretion and subsequent 
protection to business directors. In essence, the business judgement rule seeks to give directors the 
benefit of the doubt in decision making, including decisions regarding M&A, if several criteria are 
met.  
According to general business principles, business directors have a certain duty and standard of 
care; they are obligated to discharge their duties in good faith, with ordinary prudence of a person 
in like circumstance, and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interest of the 
corporation (Emanuel 173). The business judgment rule states generally that managers should not 
be said to have breached this duty of care if (Emanuel 171):  
1. The director had no “conflicting self-interest.”  
2. The director made himself “adequately informed” about relevant facts. 
3. His decision was “rational” as of the moment it was made.  
Though the business judgment rule seems to impose somewhat looser restrictions on executive 
decision making, it still poses a variety of potential objections to the execution of target defenses. 
In particular, the “management entrenchment” hypothesis suggests that bidder elimination tactics 
are employed primarily to perpetuate the reign of self-serving managers (Faulkner 25).  
However, it seems unreasonable that managers should necessarily resign themselves to the sale of 
a company they have built simply due to the certainty of returns upon sale. Defragmentation M&A 
Wilson 29 
 
offers a great alternative for start-up companies to expensive IPO launches, and yet, many directors 
choose not to sell.  
ii. Judicial Endorsements and Restrictions 
Opposing theories of business obligation have led to the myriad of opinions regarding the 
appropriateness of target defenses. In response to this diversity of thought, companies have 
sometimes sought judicial review to answer the question of a specific defense’s acceptability. The 
resulting judicial endorsements and accusations directed at target defenses have been addressed 
through the case law of the last several decades, resulting in layer upon layer of sometimes 
contradictory judgment.  
Much of this litigation and legislation has been directed at specific forms of takeover defenses, 
such as the poison pill, while some has been directed at the idea of target defenses more generally. 
In the following section, a series of landmark and otherwise notable cases will be summarized 
which form the basis of case law on the acceptability of target resistance to takeover attempts.  
a. Cheff v. Mathes and the Primary Purpose Test  
Cheff v. Mathes was a decision of the Delaware Supreme Court, decided in 1964 (Corporations 
Outline 25). In the proceeding events, Arnold Maremont, a businessman and stockholder of 
Holland Furnace Company, sought out Holland CEO, P.T. Cheff, to discuss the possibility of a 
merger. Cheff refused, at which point Maremont began building stake in Holland Furnace through 
stock purchase on the open market. Ultimately, Holland’s board negotiated the repurchase of 
Maremont’s holding at an above-market price, constituting a greenmail payment to Maremont. 
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This case included a number of complicating factors including questionable businesses practices 
on the part of Holland Furnace, Maremont’s reputation as a raider, and the perceived conflict of 
interest of Cheff and the Holland board in their desire to maintain control of the company. 
Ultimately, the Court found that the Holland board was protected by the business judgment rule, 
having acted in good faith against a credible threat to the continued existence of the company. 
The Court’s judgment established a precedent of judicial sanctioning of sometimes controversial 
greenmail practices. Furthermore, it established the primary purpose test (Corporations Outline 
25). The primary purpose test consisted of criteria used to assess the perceived conflict of interest 
of the Holland board and concerns regarding the practice of business managers to use corporate 
funds to perpetuate their own control (Corporations Outline 25-26).  
The primary purpose test says that boards motivated by a sincere belief in the danger posed to the 
business’ existing practice should not be held liable, whereas those who seek only to perpetuate 
their own control are liable (Corporations Outline 25). The test also addresses cases in which 
directors are necessarily conflicted, placing the burden of proof of primarily corporate interest on 
the directors themselves (Corporations Outline 26).  
b. Moran v. Household and Poison Pill Legitimacy  
The poison pill, as previously defined, was invented in 1983 (Subramanian 625). According to 
Subramanian, it “has never been deliberately triggered” by a would-be acquirer and is “generally 
understood to be a complete barrier to a direct attack in the form of a conventional tender offer” 
(Subramanian 625). This is due to the excessive increase in acquisitions cost created by the pill for 
a potential acquirer.  
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Immediately, the nature of the poison pill, in particular the fact that it can be adopted without a 
shareholder vote, triggers the concern of critics. These concerns may be more or less intense based 
on relative pill potency derived from “important differences in the background state corporate law” 
(Subramanian 625). Perhaps most important are the state corporate laws of Delaware, home to 
roughly half of US public companies, including Household International, Inc. (Subramanian 625).  
Household International was a diversified holding company which decided in 1984 to adopt a 
preemptive shareholder rights plan. At the time, the Household board had not been approached 
with any particular takeover threat but was concerned with the high frequency of “bust up” 
takeovers amongst industry conglomerates at the time (Spamann). At the time, board member John 
Moran, the voice of opposition against the plan, was also chairman of Household’s largest 
shareholder, Dyson-Kissner-Moran (D-K-M). D-K-M was said to have been contemplating a 
leveraged buyout of Household (Spamann). 
In 1985, Moran and D-K-M brought suit against Household for its adoption of the shareholder 
rights plan, deemed to constitute a poison pill. Ultimately, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld 
the move as a legitimate exercise of directors’ power under the business judgement rule and Del. 
Code Ann. Tit. 8, § 157 (Moran v. Household).  
c. Unocal v. Mesa and the Unocal Test 
Following the Moran v. Household judgment, Mesa Petroleum, headed at the time by a known 
corporate raider, made a two-tiered hostile bid for Unocal (Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum). The 
bid offered a $54 share price in cash to early tenderers and $54 in high-risk junk bonds to late-
comers (Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum). Because of this structure, most shareholders were 
expected to tender regardless of opinions on price fairness. 
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The Unocal board responded with a self-tender offer at a higher price for all but Mesa’s existing 
shares because “it would be counterintuitive to include the shareholder who initiated the conflict” 
(Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum). However, the Delaware Chancery Court determined this 
exclusion was not permissible, resulting in Unocal’s appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. The 
Delaware Supreme Court found that Unocal’s defensive tactics were acceptable based on their 
reasonableness in comparison to the threat of takeover.  
This verdict established an “enhanced scrutiny test,” also known as the Unocal Test, to determine 
if the business judgment rule may be applied to a target board’s decision making in the process of 
takeover defense (Enhanced Scrutiny Test). The Unocal Test has two requirements (Enhanced 
Scrutiny Test):  
1. Demonstrated reasonableness of the target board’s perception of threat and resulting 
defense. 
2. Demonstrated proportionality of the defense employed in comparison to the threat 
posed. 
Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum is considered a landmark decision of the Delaware 
Supreme Court due to the establishment of substantial precedent and the Unocal Test of 
reasonableness and proportionality. However, the Court has also specified the following 
constraint: 
“The ultimate response to an actual takeover bid must be judged by the Directors’ actions 
at that time, and nothing we say here relieves them of their basic fundamental duties to the 
corporation and its shareholders. Their use of the [poison pill] will be evaluated when and 
if the issue arises” (Subramanian 626). 
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Even with this disclaimer, the Unocal Test represents a substantial change in judicial opinions and 
precedents in M&A.  
d. Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes and the Revlon Doctrine 
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes represents yet another landmark decision on the part of the 
Delaware Supreme Court. In the events preceding the case, a number of offers were made by 
Pantry Pride to acquire Revlon (Furlow 524). Revlon responded by adopting a notes purchase 
rights plan, another poison pill, to repurchase many of its own shares (Furlow 524).  
After a substantial bidding war, Revlon sought a white knight in Forstmann to purchase shares at 
an even higher price (Furlow 524). At this point, MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. sought an 
enjoinment on behalf of Pantry Pride on the grounds that the agreement was not in the best interest 
of the shareholders and was thought not to uphold the fiduciary duties of directors (Furlow 524). 
The result of Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes was the creation of the Revlon doctrine which 
governs so-called “sales of control” (Furlow 520-521). The doctrine states, in cases where sale of 
the business is inevitable, 1. That directors should focus on maximizing immediate value for 
shareholders rather than long-term corporate well-being and 2. That if directors are perceived to 
have failed in acting on this new focus, they shall not receive protection under the business 
judgment rule (Furlow 521). Instead, the court will: 
“…review the decision with “enhanced scrutiny,” a procedure that requires independent, 
disinterested directors to prove: 1. that their decision-making process was performed with 
adequate care; and 2. that their decision was reasonable under the circumstances” (Furlow 
521). 
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These narrowed fiduciary duties are often referred to as “Revlon duties” (Furlow 521). 
The Delaware Supreme Court, upon appeal from the chancery court, found that Revlon had acted 
acceptably in adopting its poison pill. However, after the sale of the company became inevitable, 
Revlon violated its duty to achieve the highest possible sale price for stockholders by structuring 
the Forstmann deal in such a way as to put an end to the ongoing price war (Furlow 524-525). 
When dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, directors have an obligation to negotiate the 
surrender to maximize the gains of shareholders (Ventoruzzo 26-27).  
e. Paramount v. Time and the “Just Say No” Defense 
Paramount v. Time was decided in 1989 by the Delaware Supreme Court. In 1987, Steve Ross of 
Warner Brothers and Nicholas J. Nicholas, Jr. of Time met to discuss the possibility of a joint 
venture to create a superior cable network (Paramount v. Time [4]). Time strategists ultimately set 
their sights on a strategic consolidation with Warner based on a long-term expansion plan 
(Paramount v. Time [4]).  
Third parties viewed this combination as a signal that Time was up for sale. Time sought to 
establish preventive defenses but was ultimately ineffective and Paramount made a competing 
offer to purchase Time shares (Paramount v. Time [4]).  Time rejected the Paramount offer, which 
Paramount viewed as a breach of the company’s Revlon duties to maximize shareholder profit 
(Paramount v. Time [2]). Stockholders of both Time and Paramount then sued to stop the lower 
price tender offer which had been erected between Time and Warner (Paramount v. Time [3]).  
However, when the Delaware Supreme Court weighed in, it “relaxed the reigns” of the Unocal and 
Revlon decisions (Ventoruzzo 27). From this case was born the now popular “just say no” defense, 
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which provides directors with additional autonomy to reject an offer based on strategic factors 
other than price alone (Ventoruzzo 27). The Court also found that Revlon duties apply only in 
cases where a corporation has actively initiated bidding to sell itself or when sale is inevitable; in 
this case, Time intended to continue business as usual (Paramount v. Time [3]).  
f. Paramount v. QVC and the Duty to Investigate Alternatives 
Another important decision involving Paramount Communications, Paramount v. QVC was 
decided by the Delaware Supreme Court in 1994. In this instance, the Paramount board was 
considering a strategic merger with Viacom to increase competitiveness when QVC expressed its 
intent to acquire Paramount (Paramount v. QVC [1]).  
Paramount and Viacom negotiated a tentative arrangement which included a number of measures 
attempting to ensure deal closure; these measures included a no-shop clause stating that Paramount 
would not seek competing offers as well as a $100 million termination fee and certain discounted 
stock options to be paid to Viacom in the event the deal did not close (Paramount v. QVC [1]).  
QVC initiated a competing offer to buy Paramount at a higher price than the proposed Viacom 
deal but was rejected, at which point QVC filed suit. QVC insisted that Paramount was subject to 
heightened Revlon duties to seek the highest possible value for shareholders since the company 
had essentially placed itself up for sale (Paramount v. QVC [1]). Paramount argued they were not 
seeking to sell the entire company to Viacom, but rather to sell a controlling interest (Paramount 
v. QVC [1]). 
Upon appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court determined the sale constituted a sale of control and 
that such sales should be subject to enhanced scrutiny under the Revlon doctrine (Paramount v. 
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QVC [1]). After consideration under this framework, the Court ultimately found that Paramount 
had failed to adequately exercise its Revlon duties because the board had failed to adequately 
investigate the two competing offers and to protect shareholders through a sale-of-control premium 
(Paramount v. QVC [1]).  
According to earlier case law, specifically Chistophides v. Porco in 1968: 
“[A] purchaser is free to offer a premium for a block of control stock. This is so, even 
though control stock is purchased pursuant to a plan to acquire the remainder of the shared 
at a lower price…” (Bayne 616).  
In Manacher v. Reynolds in 1960, it was more specifically stated that: 
“No other factor being present, they (the shareholders) may demand a reasonable premium 
for the use of their key… with which to unlock the ‘discount’ treasure chest” (Bayne 616-
617).  
Overall, Paramount v. QVC helped establish the importance of conducting an investigation of 
alternative bidders in order to maximize shareholders gains, to protect minority shareholders, and 
to compensate them for reduced future opportunities resulting from a sale of control.  
g. Unitrin v. American General and the Range of Reasonableness  
Unitrin v. American General in 1995 built on the foundations set out in Unocal v. Mesa years 
earlier (Wong 169). In this case, American General sought to purchase a controlling block of 
Unitrin shares through a tender offer that was rejected by the Unitrin board based on its perception 
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of the deal price as inadequate (Wong 182). Unitrin then adopted a share repurchase program as a 
defense against the takeover attempt (Gallardo).  
The Court upheld the repurchase program because it was deemed to be non-preclusive; in other 
words, “the repurchase program did not mathematically preclude shareholders from dismissing the 
current board and redeeming the rights plan through a proxy contest” (Gallardo). Furthermore, the 
Court’s determination in Unitrin v. American General “broadened the range of possible defensive 
actions that directors can adopt,” expanding the proportionality test set forth in Unocal to a “less 
clearly defined ‘range of reasonableness’” standard (Ventoruzzo 27).  
iii. Current Framework for Judicial Review 
Today, in “general terms,” Delaware courts utilize a three step framework to assess the 
acceptability of target defense tactics (Wong 173). According to the Virginia Law Review, courts 
will (Wong 173):  
1. Evaluate whether the target board acted in good faith when adopting the defense.  
2. Assess whether the defense is subject to heightened scrutiny under doctrines such as 
Revlon and whether the defense is preclusive.  
3. Determine whether a defense is proportional to the threat posed. 
The contribution of case law to this modern standard is self-evident. However, formal judicial 
review of takeover cases is still a relatively new concept and relevant standards and procedures are 
still developing. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Over the past several decades, the arsenal and supporting case law of target defenses in the field 
of M&A has developed substantially. The study of target defenses has similarly increased in 
prominence and is helpful in answering the following questions which have been posed in this 
document: 
1. What factors or qualities of a company, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, contribute to its 
vulnerability to hostile takeover?  
2. What are the takeover defenses that make up the arsenal of target management?  
3. How effective and ethically permissible are various target defenses as means to 
maintain or enhance shareholder value and managerial control? 
Scholars have examined the factors and qualities of companies which contribute to their 
vulnerability. It is widely agreed that no single factor or concise set of factors can be precisely 
identified as the source of vulnerability. Vulnerability to takeover is affected by external factors 
such as the presence of raiders and strategies of competitors, as well as internal factors of target 
performance. In regards to target performance, it is a significant paradox of the acquisitions game 
that healthy business is both a source of vulnerability and the greatest defense against takeover. 
A myriad of specific defenses have been popularized, many of which are purposed specifically to 
counteract vulnerability; these preventive defenses are put in place before a specific takeover 
attack has been launched and often before any specific threat has been identified. Preventive 
defenses may or may not involve changes to the implementer’s formative documents.  
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Active defenses make up a second category of target tactics and are employed after a specific threat 
has been identified. Active defenses have been often contested by would-be acquirers. These 
contests usually revolve around the various perspectives on managerial ethics and the extent of 
decision-making autonomy vested in managers by shareholders. They are often argued in court – 
a fact which has resulted in an assortment of case law and a variety of standards by which defenses 
are judged.  
Ultimately, the target defense arsenal and related process of judicial review are relatively new 
ideas to the legal field – ideas which will likely be subject to additional development, research, 
and application in the future.  
VIII. REFLECTION 
In selecting this subject for my senior thesis through the University of South Carolina Honors 
College, my intent was as follows:  
1. To expand on the education I received during the course of the International Business 
degree as well as my semester abroad at Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien in Vienna, 
Austria.  
2. To compile a high level, comprehensible, and comprehensive listing of defensive 
tactics in the target arsenal as well as the related case law. 
3. To select an interdisciplinary topic relevant to my personal interests and intended future 
studies. 
Throughout my undergraduate program, I have worked to explore the intersection of business and 
legal studies. In this spirit, my degree has included courses such as Business Law, as well as The 
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Trial of Othello, an experimental literary mock trial course through the University of South 
Carolina Honors College. During my semester abroad, my courses included Economics and Law 
in the European Union, as well as, most significantly, International Mergers and Acquisitions.  
My course in International Mergers and Acquisitions was conducted off-campus at Schönherr, a 
law firm in the beautiful and historic first district of Vienna. The course was led by partners and 
Harvard Alumni, Christian Herbst and Sascha Hödl. This class represented my first exposure to 
the field of M&A and comprised several hundred pages of reading which served as the primary 
basis for the formulation of this thesis.  
In examining the extensive materials provided by this class, it occurred to me that the focus on 
target vulnerability and defenses was highly limited. The company line on these issues seemed 
only to be that no one truly knows why companies are targeted for takeover since few consistent 
patterns have been detected to link targets according to size, performance, or other metrics. 
Furthermore, most lists of target defenses are decidedly non-exhaustive. Most focus on only a few 
defenses at a level of baffling detail.  
The scenario is much the same with regards to the relevant case law. Full judicial decisions are 
available as are highly detailed, so-called case summaries. However, outside of Wikipedia, 
information on the background events leading to the decisions or really any information at all that 
has been expressed in a concise and functional manner is surprisingly scarce. Additionally, though 
one relevant M&A case summary may reference another, leading the reader to discover it, few 
comprehensive, chronological summaries exist to demonstrate the complex development of this 
form of judicial review.  
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It was thus one of the goals of this paper to create a practical, comprehensive reference source for 
newcomers to the study of M&A law. The listing of target defenses has been compiled from a 
variety of different sources, as has the history of relevant case law. These lists have also been 
contextualized in an overview of basic M&A principles and a limited history of the field.  
From the time I began the International Business Program at USC, it was my intent to leverage my 
degree toward a career in law. In this highly interdisciplinary field, I feel I will be able to creatively 
utilize my various skills and interests in areas such as English, political science, and, of course, 
business. In the next several months, I will be applying to a number of law schools in order to 
pursue my professional goals. With that in mind, I am tremendously grateful for the opportunity 
created for me by the Honors College thesis requirement to conduct such relevant and intriguing 
academic research.  
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IX. APPENDIX 
i. Legal Process for M&A 
The general deal shaping process for an acquisition is as follows (Bruner 685-687): 
1. Strategic planning, search, and identification of an appropriate target by the acquirer.  
2. Initial contact between the acquirer and target, comprising the proposal or “pitch.”  
3. Signing of the confidentiality agreement and related documents to preserve competitive 
advantage, R&D information, and trade secrets of the target during the bidder’s due 
diligence.  
4. Filing of the term sheet and letter of intent to confirm the growing level of commitment. 
5. Buyer’s due diligence and negotiation of a definitive agreement. 
6. Affirmative vote by target board of directors. 
7. Legally mandated disclosure of the deal to the public and regulators. 
8. Antitrust filings and permission of relevant competition authorities.  
9. Informing of target shareholders and gaining of an affirmative vote. 
10. Closing, at which parties affirm all representations, warranties, and covenants have 
been met. 
11. Initiation of a post-merger integration process to align practices of the acquisition and 
acquirer.  
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ii. Poison Pill Diagram 
 
(Subramanian 629) 
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